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Abstract. Many terrorist attacks are accomplished by bringing explo-
sive devices hidden in ordinary-looking objects to public places. In such
case, it is almost impossible to distinguish a terrorist from ordinary peo-
ple just from the isolated appearance. However, valuable clues might
be discovered through analyzing a series of actions of the same person.
Abnormal behaviors of object fetching, deposit, or exchange in public
places might indicate potential attacks. Based on the widely equipped
CCTV surveillance systems at the entrance of many public places, this
paper proposes an algorithm to detect such abnormal behaviors for early
warning of terrorist attack.
1 Introduction
After September 11, the global “War on Terrorism” has become one of the main
challenges of our time. Although great eﬀorts have been taken all over the world
to protect innocent people from terrorist attacks, it still appears to be, as the
US President George W. Bush appropriately labeled, “a long war against a
determined enemy”. Besides the political and military actions, new technologies
in various areas are urgently demanded to ensure the victory in this war.
One of the most common terrorist attack patterns is to bring explosive devices
hidden in ordinary-looking objects to public places. Recent examples are the
London bombings (7 July 2005) and the Bali bombings (1 October 2005), both
resulting in massive casualty. The early warning of such attacks is extremely
diﬃcult since a terrorist carrying a camouﬂaged bomb is not evidently diﬀerent
in appearance from an ordinary people. Thus it is almost impossible to detect
in advance the potential danger of such attacks through conventional CCTV
surveillance systems mounted in public places.
Although the isolated appearance is insuﬃcient to distinguish terrorists from
ordinary people, clues of abnormal behaviors could be discovered by considering
the combination of a sequence of actions. During the procedure of explosive de-
vice preparation, delivery and the ﬁnal attack, the members of terrorist group
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Table 1. Combination of the Enter/Exit Actions and the Indicated Behaviors
Enter Exit Behavior Code
Without Object Without Object Normal N1
With Object With the Same Object Normal N2
Without Object With Object Abnormal (Fetch) A1
With Object Without Object Abnormal (Deposit) A2
With Object With the Diﬀerent Object Abnormal (Exchange) A3
need to fetch, exchange and deposit objects of certain size. These behaviors are
very rare in many public places, but are not easy to be discovered by security
oﬃcers because it is almost impossible for human oﬃcers to remember every
passing individual and the object he/she is carrying. In this paper, a surveil-
lance algorithm named ROSY (RObust SYmmetry) is proposed to automati-
cally detect such abnormal behaviors and warn people before potential terrorist
attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the ROSY al-
gorithm is explained in detail. Then the experimental results are reported and
analyzed in Section 3. Finally conclusions are drawn in Section 4.
2 The ROSY Algorithm
The application environment of ROSY is illustrated in Fig. 1. The algorithm
is designed to work with monochromatic stationary video sources, either visible
or infrared. Camera 1 is used to image the entering person, and Camera 2 is
used to image the exiting person. Images from both cameras are sent to the
processor installed with ROSY. Each entering person is registered in a database,
and each exiting person is checked with the database. If any abnormal behavior
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is detected, the system will send a warning message to the security oﬃcer and
display the suspicious behavior on the monitor.
The possible combinations of the entering and exiting actions, together with
the indicated behaviors are tabulated in Table 1. Three of the ﬁve situations
indicate abnormal behaviors, corresponding to object fetching, deposit and ex-
change, respectively. The behaviors are coded as N1, N2, A1, A2, and A3.
The ﬂow chart of the ROSY algorithm is show in Fig. 2. The algorithm as-
sumes that the background is relatively steady. Thus motion detection can be
achieved through training a Gaussian model for each background pixel over a
short period and comparing the background pixel probability to that of an uni-
form foreground model. The result of motion detection is the silhouette map of
the foreground, see Fig. 3(b) as an example. If signiﬁcant motion is detected,
which means a person is passing the entrance, the foreground image is sent to
Robust Symmetry Analysis (RSA) to determine whether the person is carrying
an object and segment the human body and the object. The details of RSA
will be described in Section 2.1. If the person is entering (captured by Cam-
era 1 in Fig. 1), then the person and the object (if any) are registered into
the database. If the person is exiting (captured by Camera 2), then the per-
son is recognized and the object (if any) is veriﬁed. If any abnormal behavior
(A1, A2, A3) is detected, the algorithm will raise a warning message. Other-
wise, it will remove the record of the person from the database. The registration
and recognition/veriﬁcation of persons and objects will be further discussed in
Section 2.2.
2.1 Robust Symmetry Analysis
The basic idea of ROSY is from the observation that the frontal view of the
human body is approximately symmetric, and such symmetry will be violated
if people carries an object. The problem is that, in many cases, body motion
will also cause some body parts to violate the symmetry. Take Fig. 3(a) as
an example, except for the object, the arms and legs are also not symmetric
about the middle line of the body. So the algorithm must be able to distinguish
whether the asymmetry is caused by an object or body motion. Backpack [1]
did this through shape periodicity analysis. Unfortunately there are no suﬃcient
periodic images in the scenarios of this paper. On the one hand, while people
pass an entrance, they often do something, such as slow down walking speed,
stop to identify themselves, and open the door, all of which will violate their
usual walking periodicity. On the other hand, the entrance is often located at
relatively narrow places, such like the entrance of a subway train, or a door by
the corridor, where no periodicity can be detected since the person appears in
the scene for only a short time. Thus Backpack is not suitable for the application
here. Instead, ROSY achieves this by Robust Symmetry Analysis (RSA), based
on as few as one image. There are mainly two steps in RSA. The ﬁrst step is
to analyze the symmetry of the silhouette, which narrows down the interested
region for the second step, appearance symmetry analysis.
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Fig. 3. Robust Symmetry Analysis. (a) Original image;(b) Symmetric axis and non-
symmetric region;(c) SIFT key points;(d) Key points classiﬁcation;(e) Segmentation.
Silhouette Symmetry Analysis. Fist of all, the symmetric axis of the human
body is estimated. Suppose the height of the silhouette is h, the algorithm only
consider the highest h/10 and the lowest h/10. The horizontal middle point of
the upper h/10 silhouette m1 is regarded as one end of the symmetric axis.
The lower h/10 silhouette might consist of several disconnected regions. The
horizontal distance from m1 to the horizontal middle point of each region is
calculated, and the mean of those middle points within a certain distance to m1
is regarded as the other end of the symmetric axis m2. The estimated symmetric
axis of the silhouette is shown as a red line in Fig. 3(b).
Suppose the estimated symmetric axis is [m1,m2], pl and pr are a pair of
pixels on the silhouette boundary such that the line segment between them
perpendicularly intersects with [m1,m2] at ps. Let d(p1, p2) denote the distance
between p1 and p2. Then the symmetry of a pixel px on the line segment [pl, pr]
is determined by
sym(px) =
{
false if d(px, ps) > min(d(pl, ps), d(ps, pr)) + ε
true otherwise, (1)
where sym(px) = false means px is a nonsymmetric pixel, and ε is a predeﬁned
small number. As an example, the nonsymmetric region in Fig. 3(b) is denoted
by green. In order to make the algorithm more robust against image noise and
the slightly asymmetry of human body, only those nonsymmetric region larger
than a certain size (predeﬁned minimum width, height and area) is considered.
Appearance Symmetry Analysis. In order to segment the object and the
human body, the appearance of both the symmetric and nonsymmetric regions
are compared with the other side of the symmetric axis. ROSY extracts the
SIFT features [2] for image matching purpose. The SIFT feature positions of the
foreground in Fig. 3(a) are shown in Fig. 3(c). Each SIFT key point is modeled
by its position, scale and orientation so that scale and rotation invariance can
be achieved. Experimental results [2] have shown that reliable recognition is
possible with as few as 3 SIFT features. Thus even when a large portion of the
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object is occluded by other objects, it is still possible to be recognized. All of
these advantages of SIFT make it suitable for body part matching, where scaling,
rotation, and partial occlusion are all possible.
The SIFT matching is performed in a batch way, i.e. not only the single
feature is matched to each other, but also those groups of features that agree
to the same object pose are examined. Thus before matching, the SIFT features
in both the symmetric and nonsymmetric regions should ﬁrst be clustered into
groups. In ROSY, the clustering is based on the positions of the SIFT key points
and the texture of a small patch around the key point. In detail, each key point
is represented by a triplet
t =< x, y, E > (2)
where (x, y) is the 2D coordinate of the key point and E is the entropy of the
9-by-9 neighborhood around the key point.
E = −
L−1∑
i=0
p(zi) log2 p(zi), (3)
where zi is a random variable indicating intensity, p(z) is the histogram of the
intensity levels in the 9-by-9 neighborhood, L is the number of possible intensity
levels. Then the elements of t are normalized so that they have zero mean and
unity standard deviation. Clustering is done by applying a graph based method
called Normalized Cuts [3] on the normalized t. The clusters in both the sym-
metric and nonsymmetric regions are matched to the other side of the symmetric
axis. For each cluster, if at least 3 key points match with the other side, and
they agree on the same pose, then it is regarded as part of the human body, oth-
erwise of the object. An example is shown in Fig. 3(d), where the nonsymmetric
region is green, the examined symmetric region is yellow, the positions of the
key points classiﬁed as from body part are marked by circles, and those classi-
ﬁed as from object are marked by triangles. It can be seen that most key points
are correctly classiﬁed. Finally all SIFT key points outside the colored region is
classiﬁed as from the human body. The result of RSA is shown in Fig. 3(e). If
no key point is classiﬁed as from the object, then the person is not carrying an
object.
2.2 Abnormal Behavior Detection
ROSY maintains a database to remember whoever entered the entrance, and
whatever they are carrying with them. Each entry consists of four ﬁelds: img,
withObject, bodySIFT , and objectSIFT , which respectively store the image,
whether the person is carrying an object, the SIFT key points from the body,
and the SIFT key points from the object.
When Camera 2 in Fig. 1 images somebody, i.e. somebody is exiting the
entrance, ROSY ﬁrst recognizes the person from the records in the database.
This is achieved through matching the bodySIFT of the current image to those
stored in the database. The record with the maximum number of matching key
Abnormal Behavior Detection for Early Warning of Terrorist Attack 1007
Image
Silhouette
Camera
Behavior
1 211 12 1 2 2 2
enter A1enterenter enterA3 enter N2 A2 N1
Fig. 4. Behavior detection in part of the random sequence
N1 N2 A1 A2 A3
N1
N2
A1
A2
A3
(a)
N1 N2 A1 A2 A3
N1
N2
A1
A2
A3
(b)
N1 N2 A1 A2 A3
N1
N2
A1
A2
A3
(c)
N1 N2 A1 A2 A3
N1
N2
A1
A2
A3
(d)
Fig. 5. Confusion matrices. (a) Trial 1; (b) Trial 2; (c) Trial 3; (d) Average
points that agree on the same pose is regarded as from the same person. Then
the entering and exiting proﬁles of the same person are compared with each
other. Based on the ﬁeld withObject, three behaviors (N1, A1, A2) in Table 1
is decidable. If the person entered and is exiting both with an object, then the
object is further veriﬁed to see whether it is the same one that the person brought
in. This is achieved by matching the objectSIFT of the two images, if there are
more than 3 matching key points agree on the same pose, then the objects are
the same (behavior N2), otherwise they are diﬀerent (behavior A3).
3 Experiment
We have collected video clips from 20 diﬀerent persons. Each person entered and
exited a room in 6 diﬀerent states respectively, among which 4 states are with
an object (each time a diﬀerent one), and 2 states are without object (one is
walking normally, the other is walking with some variation). There are totally 4
diﬀerent objects: a backpack, a handbag, a luggage, and a box. The real scenario
at the entrance of public place is simulated by creating a random sequence of
the video clips. Part of the sequence is shown in the second line of Fig. 4 (labeled
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Table 2. Abnormal Behavior Detection Rate (DR) and False Alarm Rate (FAR)
Trial 1 2 3 avg. std.
DR (%) 88.16 90.06 89.26 89.16 0.95
FAR (%) 5.30 3.65 4.90 4.62 0.86
with ‘image’). Three such random video sequences of length 1000 is generated
to test the ROSY algorithm.
Part of the behavior detection results are shown in Fig. 4. The silhouettes of
the corresponding images with non-symmetric regions marked by green are show
in the line labeled ‘silhouette’. Note that only when the image is captured by
camera 2 does the algorithm detect a behavior listed in Table 1. Otherwise the
behavior is ‘enter’.
The performance of ROSY is illustrated as confusion matrices shown in Fig. 5,
where rows represent the real behavior labels and columns represent the labels
classiﬁed by ROSY. The intensity of each square indicates the probability of the
behavior corresponding to the row being classiﬁed as the behavior corresponding
to the column. The darker the square, the higher the probability. It can be seen
that most behaviors in the three random sequences are correctly classiﬁed. The
confusion mainly occurs between N2 and A3. This is because that there might
be large diﬀerence in the view angle from the camera to the object and the
object might be remarkably deformed. In such cases, automatic veriﬁcation of
the object is extremely hard. One way to solve this problem is to display any
amphibolous behaviors between N2 and A3 on the monitor and let the security
oﬃcer make the ﬁnal decision.
As for abnormal behavior detection (A1, A2, A3), the detection rate (DR) and
false alarm rate (FAR) of the 3 trials are tabulated in Table 2. It reveals that high
detection rate and low false alarm rate can be achieved by ROSY. The average
detection rate over all three trials is 89.16%, while the average false alarm rate
is 4.62%. Moreover, the small standard deviation indicates the relatively steady
performance of ROSY in diﬀerent situations.
4 Conclusions
This paper proposes an abnormal behavior detection algorithm named ROSY
for early warning of potential terrorist attack. Unlike previous work on abnormal
behavior detection, ROSY aims to discover the abnormality concealed in a series
of sub-behaviors, each of which alone is normal. This endows ROSY with the
ability to detect behaviors like object fetching, deposit, and exchange, which is
very rare in many public places and indicates potential danger of terrorist attack.
Moreover, by using a novel technique called Robust Symmetry Analysis, ROSY
can work on as few as one image, which makes it suitable to apply to the widely
equipped CCTV systems at the entrance of many public places.
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